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Abstract:   The aim  of this  paper  is to  propose  that  both  Hegel  and  Peirce  are 
committed  to two arguments against  the notion  that  metaphysics is impossible, 
where not only do they claim metaphysics is possible,  but that they also insist on 
the  indispensability  of this  philosophical discipline.  In the  first argument, both 
Hegel and  Peirce argue  that  it is impossible  to eliminate  metaphysical concepts 
from ordinary language and our scientific practices.  In the second argument, both 
Hegel and Peirce argue that metaphysics is a necessary  part of intellectual enquiry 
on the grounds  that metaphysics is indispensable for human  development. Such is 
the philosophical significance  of both their views on the indispensability of meta- 
physics  that  there  is every  reason  to  regard  Hegel  and  Peirce  as  representing 
powerful challenges to eliminativist attitudes to metaphysical enquiry. The purpose 
of my paper is to justify the exercise of metaphysics as a “humanistic discipline”, to 
use an expression from Bernard Williams. Using perfectionist approaches to ethics 
as a framework in which to contextualise the question  of whether  it could ever be 
desirable   to  eliminate   metaphysics is  under-explored and  potentially a  major 
avenue  through  which to explore the way we do metaphysics today. 
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I 
 
Hegel and Peirce are metaphysical thinkers.  By ‘a metaphysical thinker’ – to take 
my lead from Jonathan Lowe’s definition  of metaphysics1 – I mean someone  who 
makes general enquiries into the fundamental structure of reality as a whole.2  As is 
 
 
1  Compare  this  with  Adrian  Moore’s  definition   of  metaphysics:  “Metaphysics  is  the  most 
general  attempt  to make sense  of things”. (Moore 2012: 1). 
2 Lowe (2002: 2–3). It is important to note  that  no definition  of metaphysics is ever likely to 
meet  with  universal  acceptance, simply  because  the  concept  of metaphysics is essentially  a 
contested concept. 
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well-known,  one  of Kant’s  principal  aims  in  the  Critique of Pure  Reason  is to 
establish the limits of human  cognition,  and  thereby  provide  a new foundation 
for metaphysical enquiry: he sees metaphysics as being dependent on certain 
epistemological principles  being established about  what human  beings can know 
and what human beings cannot know – i. e. our conception of metaphysics is going 
to rely on what epistemological principles we can establish about how our cognition 
works and  how,  if at all, it can (and  invariably)  does  goes wrong.  Though  Kant 
defines  metaphysics as the cognitive  enterprise that  aims  to grasp  the uncondi- 
tioned (infinite) through pure reason (cf. B7, 378–88, 395), one should not take such 
utterances to tell us everything  about  how Kant understands the discipline, for he 
draws  an important distinction between  ‘general  metaphysics’ (metaphysica  gen- 
eralis) and ‘special  metaphysics’ (metaphysica specialis). 
General  metaphysics (ontology)  is concerned with the  nature  of objects  in 
general  and  our cognition  of objects in general,  whereas  special  metaphysics is 
concerned with our cognition  of a particular class  of objects,  namely  God, the 
world,  and  the  self of rational  psychology  as presented by Descartes,  Leibniz, 
Wolff, and others. Given that general  metaphysics and special metaphysics have 
different  objects  of enquiry,   each  discipline   makes  a  specific  error  which  is 
exposed   in  a  unique   way.  With  regard  to  general  metaphysics, Kant  argues 
that  philosophers such  as Leibniz and  Wolff hold  that  one can  acquire  knowl- 
edge of objects in general  merely through  either  the laws of general  logic, such 
as  the  Principle   of  Non-Contradiction,  or  through   the  exercise  of  the  pure 
concepts  of the  understanding, the  concepts  of transcendental logic. The error 
of general  metaphysics, then,  is that  it violates  one  of the  principles  of Kant’s 
Discursivity  Thesis,  namely  that  concepts  without  intuitions are  empty,  where 
the error consists  in holding  that  the unschematised use of categorial  concepts, 
i. e. the  application of concepts  independently of the  conditions of sensibility, 
establishes knowledge  (or at  least  determinate cognition)  of objects.  A conse- 
quence  of acknowledging this mistake,  as Kant famously  states,  is that  “… the 
proud  name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic  a priori cognitions  of 
things  in general  … must  give way to the more modest  title of a transcendental 
analytic” (A247/B304). What this means  is that  given the failure of general 
metaphysics to justify synthetic  a priori knowledge, due  to its dogmatism, the 
only  viable  means  of  adequately justifying  this  kind  of  knowledge   is  to  be 
provided  by a transcendental analysis  of our cognitive  capacities. 
With regard to special metaphysics, the error of this area of metaphysics consists 
in judgements concerning God, the world,  and  the immortal  and  immaterial  self 
being infected with transcendental illusion – the conflation of our cognitive interests 
and the conceptual features of certain phenomena with the determination of things in 
themselves: for example,  our judgements about the self being a simple, immaterial 
  
 
 
 
substance are based  on the illegitimate  conflation  of conceptual properties  of the 
notion of the self – that of simplicity, unity, and subjectivity – with a metaphysic of 
the self as something simple and substantial. In other words, we commit the fallacy of 
hypostatisation when we think about  the self from the perspective  of rational  psy- 
chology. Indeed, rational psychology, according to Kant, is just one of the branches of 
special metaphysics that is infected with various fallacies, such as paralogisms, 
amphibolies, subreption and hypostatisation, because  these formal errors permeate 
our cognitive practices  when we also engage with the philosophical questions and 
methodologies of rational  cosmology and rational  theology. 
While these  critical comments  from Kant about  metaphysics may still leave 
room for metaphysics in some sense  (as Kant seems  to have wanted),  I am just 
using Kant’s critique of metaphysics to provide a background to the different 
approach offered by Hegel and  Peirce in what  follows. 
Starting  with Hegel, we find his response is rather  emphatic: 
 
[E]veryone possesses and uses the wholly abstract category of being. The sun is in the sky; 
these  grapes  are  ripe,  and  so on  ad  infinitum. Or, in  a higher  sphere  of education,  we 
proceed  to  the  relation   of  cause  and  effect,  force  and  its  manifestation,  etc.  All our 
knowledge  and  ideas  are  entwined  with  metaphysics like this  and  governed  by it; it is 
the net which holds together  all the concrete  material  which occupies  us in our action and 
endeavour. But this  net  and  its  knots  are  sunk  in  our  ordinary  consciousness beneath 
numerous layers of stuff. This stuff comprises  our known interests  and the objects that are 
before our minds,  while the universal  threads  of the net remain  out of sight  and  are not 
explicitly made  the subject  of our reflection.  (LHP: 27–8) 
Categories, like being, or singularity, are already mingled into every proposition, even what 
it has a completely  sensible  content:  “This leaf is green”. (EL: §3, 27) 
 
For Hegel, not only is metaphysics possible and viable, metaphysics is also 
unavoidable.  Hegel denies  that  it is possible  to have a standpoint in which our 
concern  for ordinary  states  of affair is free from metaphysical speculation and 
concepts.  In other words, it is impossible for us to not have metaphysical 
commitments in some  way or another  even  when  we are  in situations which 
seem paradigmatic cases of ordinary  language usage.3 To quote David Oderberg, 
who would  agree with Hegel on this subject: 
 
 
3 Interestingly, however, one may claim what Hegel argues,  namely that metaphysical concepts 
are ineliminable in language, does not obviously mean metaphysical concepts  bind enquirers  to 
engage  in speculative  philosophy, which  is a very specific  genus  of metaphysical enquiry.  In 
response, though, I do not think Hegel’s aim in the passages I quoted  is to justify the unavoid- 
ability of speculative idealism, rather  his concerns  here are more modest.  The task of character- 
ising metaphysical concepts  in a speculative way – i. e. using dialectical  logic to make sense of 
concepts  such  as  finitude  and  infinity  – is not  the  focus  of Hegel’s  attention in  the  above 
passages, but is of course  a central  aspect  of his work on metaphysics. 
  
 
 
Natural  language is permeated and  saturated by metaphysics, and  has been so ever since 
philosophy began  with  the  pre-Socratics  …  The problem  is  in  thinking  that  there  is a 
vantage  point  from which we can espy language in its ‘ordinary’, pre-metaphysical state. 
There is no such  vantage  point  because  there  is no such  language to be observed  in the 
first place.4 
 
The unavoidability of metaphysics, therefore,  consists  in the ubiquity  of metaphy- 
sical concepts  in language.
5 
A similar claim is made by Lowe, who writes: “[i]n my 
view, all other  forms of inquiry  rest  upon  metaphysical presuppositions – thus 
making  metaphysics unavoidable – so that  we should  at least  endeavour to do 
metaphysics with our eyes open,  rather  than  allowing  it to exercise its influence 
upon us at the level of uncritical  assumption”.6 
In response, the  Kantian  may  well agree  that  we have  metaphysical con- 
cepts in our thinking,  and that we ought to investigate those concepts  in order to 
get clear about  our thinking.  However, this does not mean that we should  think 
we can do anything more than  conduct  an enquiry  of this sort, and instead  take 
ourselves  to be thereby investigating the world as it ultimately  is. To quote Lowe 
here,  though, 
 
ironically enough, any such attempt  [to focus on the structure of thought and separate that 
enquiry  from the  structure of being]  would  undermine the  very position  [the Kantian]  is 
trying to defend:  for in order to make any such attempt, the Kantian will have to engage in 
genuine  metaphysical argument as traditionally conceived.  He will have to deny a certain 
thesis  concerning the  nature  of a certain  category  of entities  – thoughts – conceived  as 
being elements  of a mind-independent reality … Questions  to do with content  themselves 
have,  inescapably, a genuinely  metaphysical dimension, that  is, a dimension which does 
not have solely to do with the content  of thoughts about  content.7 
 
Turning now to Peirce: 
 
Find a scientific  man  who proposes  to get along  without  any  metaphysics – not  by any 
means every man who holds the ordinary reasonings of metaphysicians to scorn – and you 
have found one whose doctrines  are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticised 
metaphysics with which they are packed.  We must  philosophise, said the great naturalist 
Aristotle – if only to avoid philosophising. Every man of us has a metaphysics, and has to 
have  one;  and  it will influence  his  life greatly.  Far  better,  then,  that  that  metaphysics 
should  be criticised and not be allowed to run loose … In short, there is no escape from the 
need  of a critical examination of “first principles”. (CP: 1.129) 
 
 
 
4 Oderberg (2007: 43). 
5 See Ellis (2001) and  Lowe (2006). 
6 Lowe (1998: v). 
7  Lowe (2002: 8–9). 
  
 
 
 
Like Hegel,  Peirce  argues  that  not  only  is  it  impossible   to  avoid  meta- 
physics in ordinary  language, but also that to reject metaphysics is to do 
metaphysics. It is not  just  that  ordinary  language is packed  with metaphysi- 
cal  concepts,8  but  even  those  conservative naturalist attitudes such  as  posi- 
tivism and eliminativist varieties of nominalism also contain  metaphysical 
commitments. So, for all of the  positivists’  and  eliminativists’ insistence that 
they   have   successfully   purged   enquiry   of  metaphysics “in  the   spirit   of 
Newton’s  ‘hypotheses non  fingo’”,9  they  are  committed  in  some  way  to  the 
very enterprise that they seek to reject. There is therefore something  self- 
undermining about  anti-metaphysics, which shows metaphysics to be indis- 
pensable – just  as  there  is  something  self-undermining  about  denying  the 
Principle  of Non-Contradiction, insofar  as  to do so itself involves  employing 
the  principle. 
This  way  of  interpreting  what   can   be   dubbed   ‘The  Indispensability 
Argument’  as  developed   respectively   by  Hegel  and  Peirce  is  one  which  I 
principally attribute  to  Stern  (2009).  I  am,  of  course,   very  sympathetic  to 
Stern’s   way  of  understanding  Hegel  and   Peirce  on  this  subject.   Even  so, 
though, I would  like  to emphasise that  I take  the  issue  a  step  further  than 
Stern,10  because  I now want  to deal  with an objection  to the Indispensability 
Argument  which  Stern  has  not  addressed in  his  work.11   The objection  con- 
cerns a lack of clarity in the Indispensability Argument as to which kind of 
metaphysics  is  indispensable.12    To  start,   I  would   like  to  explain   Stern’s 
distinction between  ‘weak’  metaphysics and  ‘strong’  metaphysics: 
(a)  ‘Weak metaphysics is indispensable’: we have to make very general  claims 
about  the world. 
(b)  ‘Strong   metaphysics  is  indispensable’:  we  have   to  make   very  general 
claims  about  every possible  world,  as  opposed  to only how  things  are  in 
this world. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 See also CP: 1.229 and  CP: 7.579. 
9 Stern (2009: 4). 
10 An additional difference  between  me and  Stern,  though  it is not  on grounds  of disagree- 
ment, concerns  how we respectively  develop  the connection between  the necessity  of metaphy- 
sical enquiry  and  the possibility  of flourishing. 
11  I wish to note here that the objection  to the Indispensability Argument that I shall deal with 
was raised  by Stern in conversation with me in Sheffield in September  2014. 
12  I think  this  issue  also  affects  Lowe’s  position  on  the  unavoidability of metaphysics.  For 
example,  Lowe seems  to  switch  between  construing the  indispensability of metaphysics on 
weak grounds  (Lowe 2002: 6), and  on strong  grounds  (Lowe 2002: 10–11). 
  
 
 
The difference  between  weak and  strong  metaphysics concerns  how sensi- 
tively we construe  the idea of indispensability here. According to weak meta- 
physics,  we only need  to make  very general  claims  about  how this world is, at 
the most general  ontological  level. According to strong metaphysics, we have to 
make very general  claims about  how all possible  worlds are, at the most general 
ontological  level. 
There is good reason  to suppose Hegel is committed  to strong  metaphysics, 
because   his  famous   use  of  the  ‘All  Determination  is  Negation’  principle   is 
concerned with  establishing the  structure of being  simpliciter,  as  opposed   to 
only being as it is in this world.13  For Hegel, the negation that accompanies 
determination is a necessary  condition for the possibility  of being in any genu- 
ine sense.  In other  words,  Hegel claims  that  if anything  is to be,  then  it must 
have  determination and  so negation. His argument can  be understood as  fol- 
lows: for anything to be more than  just a completely  formal and  abstract pure 
being, which for Hegel is the same as nothingness,
14 
there must be some kind of 
determination. Such  determination must  involve  some  negation.15  Further  evi- 
dence for thinking  that Hegel’s metaphysics is an instance  of strong metaphysics 
can  be found  in the  Logic, where  Hegel argues  for the  necessary  metaphysical 
structure of infinity: 
 
[It is said that] the infinite,  one the one side, exists by itself, and that the finite which has 
gone  forth  from  it into  a  separate existence  …  ; but  it should  rather  be  said  that  this 
separation is incomprehensible … But equally  it must  be said  that  they  are  comprehen- 
sible,  to grasp  them even as they are in ordinary  conception, to see that  in the one there 
lies the determination of the other … is to see the simple insight into their inseparability … 
This unity of the finite and infinite and the distinction between them are just as inseparable 
as are finitude  and  infinity. (SL: 153–154) 
 
 
 
 
13  Cf. SL: 113, 536; and  EL: § 87Z, § 91Z. 
14 Cf. SL: 82. 
15  See the following from Stephen  Houlgate: 
“For Parmenides … [t]rue being  is thus  purely  affirmative  with no trace of negation or indeed 
change   in  it;  it  is  thus  ‘uncreated and  imperishable’.  This  conception  of  being  as  purely 
affirmative  continues to cast  its shadow  over subsequent philosophy right  up  to the  modern 
period.  It is to be seen,  for example,  in Spinoza’s  assertion that  ‘the  definition  of any  thing 
affirms,  and  does  not  deny,  the  thing’s  essence,’  … [But] According  to Hegel’s  account, the 
category  of being proves to harbour within itself the moment  of negation in several forms: The 
concept  of reality entails  negation in the form of determinacy and  difference;  being something 
entails negation in the form of otherness and finitude; and infinite being also contains  negation 
insofar  as it lives in and  through  self-negating, finite beings”. (Houlgate  2006: 43–4) 
See also Stern (2016). 
  
 
 
 
From the above passage, we can construct  the following argument: 
(1)  If the finite is separate from the infinite,  then  there  is something  outside  of 
the infinite. 
(2)  There is nothing  outside  of the infinite. 
(3)  Therefore, the finite is not separate from the infinite. 
 
Hegel is concerned with dismissing  the claims of pre-Kantian  rationalists as 
metaphysical conjecture, since  if the  infinite  were understood in opposition to 
the finite, then the infinite would be finite itself, because  it would be limited by 
the finite. “There would then be per impossibile a greater reality than the infinite. 
Hence,  the  true  infinite  must  therefore  include  the  finite”.16  As with  his argu- 
ment  concerning the necessary  structure of being  simpliciter, Hegel’s metaphy- 
sical claim is directed  at providing  us with synthetic  a priori knowledge  of the 
necessary  ontological  conditions for things:  being cannot  be being simpliciter if 
it does not have negations; and the infinite cannot  be the infinite simpliciter if it 
is separate from the finite. Both Hegelian arguments are instance  of strong 
metaphysics, because   they  are  concerned with  establishing the  structure of 
reality simpliciter, as opposed  to only reality as it is in this world. 
Thus  far,  I  have  argued   that  claiming  Hegel’s  concerns   in  the  opening 
chapters  of the  Logic are  only  concerns  with  explicating the  necessary  condi- 
tions for being in this world seems rather  implausible as a reading of Hegel. But 
does this not raise a philosophical problem with the Indispensability Argument 
considered from the perspective of strong metaphysics? For, consider  the follow- 
ing situation: there could be someone  who is suspicious of the viability of 
metaphysics tout  court  but  who  would  be  prepared to  accept  that  their  own 
position  involves  some  metaphysical commitments to  universals and  laws  of 
nature, to adequately make  sense  of the  world  we experience. Their basis  for 
doing so lies in recognising  the deficiency of nominalist positions  on universals 
and  laws,  in that  these  nominalist positions  fail to adequately make  sense  of 
things  here  to the  extent  that  nominalism runs  afoul  of the  principles  of the 
natural sciences.  But, when  asked  if they think  universals and  laws are neces- 
sary for being in all possible worlds, they reply that it is not clear that universals 
and  laws are necessary  for being-qua-being  even though  they are necessary  for 
being in this world – why think  that  just because  universals and  laws of nature 
are necessary  for making sense of this world, that we are obliged to suppose 
universals and  laws  of nature  are  necessary  for making  sense  of all  worlds? 
Could there  not be at least  one possible  world which does not require  univers- 
ality and  nomological  properties in order to be intelligible? 
 
 
16 Beiser (2005: 142). 
  
 
 
As I see it, the challenge to defending a strong  metaphysical articulation of 
the  Indispensability Argument,  at  least  with  regard  to  Hegel’s  metaphysics, 
turns  on  whether   arguments for  realism  are  ontologically extensive,   in  that 
their  conclusions apply  across  all possible  worlds  rather  than  just  this  world, 
and  whether  the  Kantian  claim to do weak  metaphysics while being  agonistic 
about  all  possible  worlds  is incoherent. I contend  that  Hegel’s  arguments  for 
realism about universals and laws of nature  are ontologically extensive,  and that 
he  has  some  reason  to  legitimately  think  the  Kantian  position  is incoherent. 
Given  this,  Hegel  is  able  to  deny  the  objection   to  the  strong  metaphysical 
articulation of  the  Indispensability Argument:  Hegelians   would  worry  about 
weak  metaphysics on  a metaphilosophical level,  as  under  weak  metaphysics, 
we are committed  to universals and laws of nature  not just because  they do exist 
in  this  world,  but  also  because  they  are  consistent with  the  general  commit- 
ments  of  natural science.  While  of  course  Hegel  would  happily   wish  for  a 
convergence  between   the   natural  sciences   and   speculative  philosophy,17   I 
think  he  would  object  to  the  specific  kind  of convergence between  the  two 
offered by weak metaphysics: weak metaphysics appears to flirt with a concep- 
tion of the interrelation between  philosophy and science as one which sees 
philosophy having  its cognitive  value  determined by how well it supports the 
general  propositions of the  natural sciences.  Under  weak  metaphysics, robust 
ontological    commitments  to   universals  and   nomological    phenomena  are 
needed, because  they provide a speculative vindication of natural science’s 
commitments to kinds and causal  necessity.18 Such a view is correct to say 
philosophy  and  natural science  are  in  agreement  that  universals  and  laws 
exist  and  are  necessary, but  it  goes  wrong  in  conceiving  of the  philosopher 
(i. e.  the  metaphysician)  as  ultimately   an  elaborate   natural   scientist  –  for, 
according  to this particular way of explicating the relationship between  spec- 
ulative  metaphysics and  natural science,  both  the  speculative metaphysician 
and the natural scientist aim to explain  why something  in the world is thus-and- 
so, where the only real difference between the two answers lies in the different 
methodologies.19 
However, the kind of enquiry the speculative philosopher makes is crucially 
different to the enquiry made by the natural scientist  even though both the 
philosopher and  the  natural scientist   share   the  same  conclusion  about   the 
fundamental structure of this world as a whole. For, what  the metaphysician is 
 
 
17  Cf. EL: 5. 
18 Cf. EL: § 9, 33. 
19 One should  note  here  that  the  Peircean  would  probably  be happy  with characterising the 
metaphysician as an elaborate natural scientist. 
  
 
 
 
principally interested in is the  necessary  structure of being-qua-being,  and  it is 
precisely  because  the interests  of the metaphysician are more general that  they 
are  the  kind  of enquirer  they  are.  This is why Hegelian  metaphysics does  not 
stop with the question ‘Are universals necessary  in this world?’, but in fact goes 
on  to  ask  whether   or  not  there  could  be  objects  without   properties in  any 
possible  world.  Hegel’s  answer,   of  course,  is  that  such  a  possibility   cannot 
obtain,  because  the  only  possible  type  of being  is being  which  is constituted 
by the categories  of universality, particularity, and individuality. In other words, 
it is impossible  for there to be indeterminate objects, according  to Hegel’s 
metaphysics. Such a claim is an instance  of the most general  attempt  to make 
sense  of things,  and  as such  is ontologically extensive. 
Moreover, I think  there  is reason  to think  that  Hegel can claim the Kantian 
position  advocating weak metaphysics but agnosticism about all possible worlds 
is incoherent: in his construal of the categories  as necessary  conditions for the 
possibility of objects in general,
20 
Kant himself appears to make strong metaphy- 
sical  claims  about   the  forms  of  thought,  even  though   he  uses  the  forms  of 
thought to argue  for weak metaphysics.
21  
Understood  in this way, it seems  that 
Hegel would  sympathise with the argument Lowe gives here22: 
 
Ironically  enough, any  such  attempt  would  undermine the  very position  [the Kantian]  is 
trying to defend:  for in order to make any such attempt, the Kantian will have to engage in 
genuine  metaphysical argument as traditionally conceived  … 
 
But I do not think  this is the only option  for the Hegelian  who wishes  to claim 
the Kantian position  is incoherent: for, “Kant’s project seems to involve drawing 
a limit to what  we can make sense  of. But that  in turn  can seem an incoherent 
enterprise. More specifically,  it can seem self-stultifying”.23  To see why, consider 
Moore’s ‘Limit Argument’: 
(1)  We cannot  properly  draw a limit to what  we can  make  sense  of unless  we 
can make sense  of the limit. 
(2)  We cannot  make sense  of any limit unless  we can make sense  of what  lies 
on both  sides of it. 
(3)  Therefore, we cannot  properly  draw a limit to what  we can make sense  of. 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Cf. A139. 
21  See Walsh (1975: 253) for a similar claim. 
22 I  acknowledge  it  is  still  questionable  whether   the  ‘genuine metaphysical argument as 
traditionally conceived’  that  Lowe mentions  need amount  to strong metaphysics. 
23 Moore (2012: 135). 
  
 
 
Like Hegel,24 Moore regards  Kant’s position  on the unknowability of things- 
in-themselves  to  be  incoherent,  because   Kant’s  alleged   weak  metaphysical 
argument involves some kind of commitment to strong metaphysical commit- 
ments.  Given this, I think there is compelling  reason  to claim that the 
Indispensability Argument is meant to apply to strong metaphysics, at least 
according  to the Hegelian  perspective. 
I would  now  like  to  turn  to  Peirce  on  this  issue.  Like Hegel before  him, 
Peirce excoriates  nominalism rather  caustically,
25  
and  argues  for realism  about 
universals and  laws of nature. According to Stern, 
 
[i]n arguing  for realism  in this manner, Peirce will not allow the nominalist to claim that 
his  position  is somehow  innocuous or less  problematic because  devoid  of metaphysical 
commitments and  implications; the question is which  theory  best  fits with the world  as 
we find it to be, and so can account  for such phenomena as natural laws and the validity 
of our  abductive generalisations concerning individuals of the  same  type.26  (Emphasis 
added) 
 
As I understand Stern here, what he has written  could be construed as claiming 
that  Peirce’s arguments for realism  are instances of weak metaphysics, because 
the philosophical question concerning Peirce about  universals is one focused on 
the world we experience – both  nominalism and  realism  are competing  to best 
make  sense  of ‘the  world  as  we find it to be’.  What  is confusing,  however,  is 
Stern’s  textual  justification  for his reading  of Peirce: 
 
It is impossible to hold consistently that a quality only exists when it actually  inheres  in a 
body. If that were so, nothing  but individual facts would be true. Laws would be fictions; 
and  in  fact,  the  nominalist does  object  to  the  word  “law” and  prefers  “uniformity”  to 
express his conviction  that so far as the law expresses  what might happen, but does not, it 
is nugatory. If, however, no law subsists  other than expression  of actual  facts, the future is 
entirely  indeterminate and  so is general  to the  highest  degree.  Indeed,  nothing  would 
exist but the instantaneous state  … (CP: 1.422 – emphasis added) 
 
This passage appears to indicate  that  Peirce’s  metaphysical ambitions are  not 
the  same  as  those  of weak  metaphysics. Peirce  is concerned with  the  modal 
scope  of general  claims  about  the structure of being,  where  he is not so much 
interested in establishing the general  structure of this world only, but rather 
interested  in  establishing  the  general   structure of  being-qua-being.   In  other 
words,  this  passage appears to show  that  Peirce’s  metaphysics is a species  of 
 
 
 
24 Cf. EL: § 44, 87. 
25 Cf. CP: 8.38 and  CP: 7.485. 
26 Stern (2009: 38–9). 
  
 
 
 
strong  metaphysics. One may find support  for this reading  of Peirce’s metaphy- 
sics by considering the following from Paul Forster,  who writes: 
 
… Peirce thinks the science of inquiry affords a secure basis for metaphysical theorising.  In 
taking  this  view  he  stands  against  nominalists (and  others)  who  dismiss  metaphysical 
questions as unanswerable or senseless. As he sees it, his theory of inquiry – including the 
pragmatic   maxim,  the  theory  of  symbols,  the  principles   of  abduction, deduction and 
induction and the theory of truth – holds in any world in which there is a truth to discover 
… The task  of the  metaphysician … is to think  through  the  implications of the  theory  of 
inquiry for our general  concept  of reality.27 
 
Forster’s interpretation of Peirce seems to suggest  Peircean  metaphysics is an 
example  of strong  metaphysics, given just how general  is metaphysical enquiry 
for Peirce: it is about  reality, rather  than  only about  the reality of this world. As 
before  with  Hegelian  metaphysics, the  issue  turns  on whether  Peircean  meta- 
physical commitments are ontologically extensive,  and that the Kantian claim to 
do weak  metaphysics while  being  agonistic  about  all possible  worlds  is inco- 
herent.  I contend  that  Peircean  metaphysical commitments are ontologically 
extensive  when  one  considers  the  following  passage, and  that  Peirce held  the 
Kantian  position  advocating weak metaphysics but agnosticism about  all possi- 
ble worlds as being incoherent.28 Given this, Peirce is able to reject the objection 
to the strong  metaphysical articulation of the Indispensability Argument29: 
 
Now  Reality  is  an  Affair of  Thirdness   as  Thirdness,   that  is,  in  its  mediation  between 
Secondness and  Firstness  … To be a nominalist consists  in the undeveloped state  in one’s 
mind of the apprehension of Thirdness  as Thirdness.  The remedy for it consists  in allowing 
ideas of human  life to play a greater  role in one’s philosophy. Metaphysics  is the science of 
Reality. Reality consists in regularity.  Real regularity is active law. Active law is efficient 
reasonableness … Reasonable reasonableness is Thirdness  as Thirdness.  (CP: 5.121) 
 
What is interesting about  this passage is how Peirce appears to regard his triadic 
categorial-ontological structure to be a necessary  constitutive feature  of being 
simpliciter.
30 
However, in addition  to indicating his commitment to a defence  of 
 
 
27 Forster (2011: 176). 
28 Cf. EP: 1.90. 
29 However, some Peirceans  may object to interpreting Peirce as advocating strong  metaphy- 
sics, because  they may claim that  according  to Peirce’s cosmology,  the categories  of Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness are a result of evolution,  and that this would mean it is far from clear 
there could  not be a world without  those  three categories. 
30 Cf. “Giving  to being  the  broadest  possible sense … I should  define  Firstness,  Secondness, 
and  Thirdness  thus: 
Firstness  is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without  reference 
to anything else. 
  
 
 
strong  metaphysics on the basis  of the Indispensability Argument,  parts  of this 
passage also seem to point in the direction  of a different kind of critique of 
nominalism and a different kind of advocacy of metaphysical enquiry:  Peirce 
appears to construe  his  critique  of nominalism and  his  defence  of realism  in 
terms of therapeutic  language: nominalism is characterised as a sort of philoso- 
phical pathogen which prevents  us from realising  our rational  capacities. Such a 
line  of arguing  against   nominalism and  eliminativism in  favour  of a  robust 
defence  of metaphysics as  indispensable for enquiry  is noticeably  different  to 
the Indispensability Argument,31 and  is the issue I would  now like to focus on. 
In what follows, I shall discuss a powerful and interesting strategy for defending 
metaphysics,  one  which   Hegel  and   Peirce  make   on  perfectionist   grounds, 
namely  that  metaphysical speculation has  an indispensable role to play in the 
achievement of human  perfection.  Using perfectionist  approaches to ethics as a 
framework  in which  to contextualise the  question of whether  it could  ever be 
desirable  to eliminate  metaphysics is under-explored and  potentially a major 
avenue  through  which to explore  the history of philosophy. 
 
 
 
II 
 
In CP: 1.129, a passage we previously  discussed, Peirce claimed  ‘[e]very man  of 
us has a metaphysics, and has to have one; and it will influence  his life greatly’. 
The question now is how is metaphysics influencing our lives greatly.  In other 
words,  how is metaphysics directly valuable? To answer  this,  it would  be parti- 
cularly  helpful  to return  to Hegel,  who appears to offer an  explanation of the 
significance  of metaphysics in our lives: 
 
It is true that  Newton expressly  warned  physics  to beware  of metaphysics; but … let it be 
said  that  he  did  not  conduct  himself  in  accordance with  this  warning  at  all.  Only the 
animals   are  true  blue  physicists   by  this  standard, since  they  do  not  think:  whereas 
 
 
Secondness is the mode of being of that  which is such  as it is, with respect  to a second  but 
regardless of any third. 
Thirdness  is the mode of being of that  which is such  as it is, in bringing  a second  and  third 
into relation  to each other.” (CP: 8.328 – emphasis added). 
31  By this,  I do not mean  to say Hegel and  Peirce regarded  the Indispensability Argument  as 
deficient  in some way. Rather, I merely mean  that  when one looks at Hegel and  Peirce closely 
on  the  subject  of  the  indispensability  of  metaphysical enquiry,   they  bring  in  perfectionist 
elements  in defence  of metaphysics. They do  so,  because  they  see  an  important connection 
between  the kinds of theoretical positions  one adopts  and  the kinds  of practical  commitments 
one has. 
  
 
 
 
humans, in contrast, are thinking  beings, and born metaphysicians. All that matters here is 
whether  the metaphysics that  is employed  is of the right kind: and  specifically  whether  … 
we hold on to one-sided  thought-determinations fixed by the understanding, so that  they 
form the basis  of our theoretical and  of our practical  action.  (EL: §98Z, 156) 
 
What we find here is Hegel’s dismissal  of the question concerning whether 
metaphysics tout court is possible,  and his insistence on asking the ‘real’ 
metametaphysical question, ‘What kind of metaphysics is the right kind of 
metaphysics?’. The new  metametaphysical challenge posed  by Hegel amounts 
to  a  litmus  test  for  any  metaphysical system  to  not  merely  be  theoretically 
satisfying  but also practically  significant  in a specific manner.  By ‘theoretically 
satisfying’, I mean  a  theory  which  accurately  describes/represents the  funda- 
mental  structure of reality. The specific sense  of practical  significance  I have in 
mind concerns  a broadly  perfectionist  notion  that  our general  understanding of 
how all things hang together,  to use a Sellarsian  turn  of phrase,32  enables  us to 
achieve  at homeness in the world, Hegel’s term for ‘flourishing’. In other words, 
the kind of metaphysics we are properly after is going to be sufficiently general/ 
broad  (hence  not ‘one-sided’), and  one which is a metaphysics of reason/spec- 
ulative reflection (hence not ‘rigidly fixed by understanding’). The distinction, 
therefore,  between  reason  and  understanding is going to play a significant  role 
in the development of the right kind of metaphysics. Unlike Kant, Hegel does not 
claim that  “these terms … designate completely  independent functions  or facul- 
ties. Reason is simply the necessary  result of the immanent movement  of the 
understanding”.33  In other  words,  the  kind  of approach of understanding  will 
bequeath problems  to reason  that  reason  will have  to resolve  in a dialectical 
way, insofar  as reason  is a “form of holistic  explanation, which shows  how all 
finite things  are parts of a wider whole”.34  For Hegel, the principal  advantage of 
drawing  this distinction between  reason  and understanding is that we can be in 
a position  to not be wrapped up in the various  problematic dualisms which are 
the inevitable  consequence of reflecting only from the perspective of under- 
standing, i. e.  purely  analytical  methods   of  reflection,   where  these  dualisms 
force us into  contradictions and  aporias.  What  reason  provides  consciousness 
with  is the  means  to avoid  the  pitfalls  of strict  dualisms and  the  problems  of 
analysis  by thinking  dialectically, i. e. by drawing  distinctions yet establishing 
interconnectedness  to  a  whole.35   A metaphysics  which  does  not  draw  this 
distinction or  one  which  conflates   reason  with  understanding will  therefore 
 
 
32 Cf. Sellars (1963: 35). 
33 Beiser (2005: 164). 
34 Ibid., p. 165. 
35 Cf. LA I: 99–100. 
  
 
 
not  be  the  right  kind  of  metaphysics.  This  is  because   failing  to  draw  the 
distinction between  reason  and  understanding or conflating  reason  with under- 
standing results  in a one-sided  conception of thought and  a purely mechanistic 
conception of philosophic explanation. 
Given  Hegel’s  concern   with  establishing  a  metaphysics  which  not  only 
correctly grasps the structure of reality as a whole but also enables  us to exercise 
our rational  capacities in a speculative manner  so as to flourish, we can now see 
why  exactly  Hegel  and  Peirce  were  so  fond  of Aristotelianism. Starting  with 
Hegel first on this issue: 
 
Ancient  metaphysics had  in this  respect  a higher  conception of thinking  than  is current 
today.  For  it  based  itself  on  the  fact  that  the  knowledge   of  things  obtained through 
thinking  is alone  what  is really  true  in them,  that  is, things  not  in their  immediacy  but 
as first raised  into the form of thought, as things  thought. Thus this metaphysics believed 
that  thinking  (and  its determinations) is not anything alien  to the object, but rather  is its 
essential nature  … But reflective understanding took possession of philosophy … Directed 
against  reason,  it behaves  as ordinary  common sense and imposes  its view that truth rests 
on sensuous reality,  that  thoughts are only thoughts, meaning  that  it is sense  perception 
which first gives them  filling and  reality and  that  reason  left to its own resources  engen- 
ders only figments  of the brain.  In this self-renunciation on the part of reason,  the Notion 
of truth  is lost;  it is limited  to knowing  only subjective  truth,  phenomena, appearances, 
only something to which the nature  of the object itself does not correspond: knowing  has 
lapsed  into opinion.  (SL: 45–6) 
 
What Hegel means  by claiming  that  ancient  metaphysics had a “higher concep- 
tion of thinking” is unclear, and  easily  misinterpreted: rather  than  reading  his 
affection  for  ancient   metaphysics  to  amount   to  a  straightforward  desire  to 
resurrect   every  single   aspect   of  pre-Kantian   metaphysics,  we  should   read 
Hegel as making  the  following  claim:  ancient  metaphysics, pace  some  kind  of 
empiricist  positivism/scientism, understood the world as comprising  ideal enti- 
ties,  entities   which  provide  unity  and  rational   order  to  the  content   of  our 
experience. These entities,  crucially, are not objects that can be immediately 
perceived   or  empirically   verified  in  the  same  way  as  one  can  immediately 
perceive  or  empirically   verify  that  a  table  or  a  chair  exists.  Rather,  ‘ideal’ 
kinds,  such as universals, are part and parcel components of reality that require 
us to identify  certain  properties of the world that  are more basic  than  immedi- 
ately  observable sensible  properties. However,  this  does  not  mean  that  Hegel 
thinks  that metaphysics simpliciter requires  some spooky cognitive faculty, such 
as intellectual intuition – it just means  that  a discursive  consciousness, which 
takes concepts  to be the principal  (and in fact, only) means  of cognising  objects, 
must go beyond  an epistemic  framework which has a narrow/thin conception of 
thought.  An important consequence of this  view is that  if any  philosopher  is 
  
 
 
 
inclined  to think that metaphysics simpliciter is intellectually bankrupt, then the 
philosophical commitments of their view condemns their cognitive practices  and 
intellectual endeavours to an impoverished state. 
One helpful  way of understanding how Hegel thinks  anti-metaphysical 
positions  such  as nominalism result  in intellectual impoverishment is by con- 
sidering his views on concrete  universality in the Science of Logic, where Hegel’s 
discussion of the Concept is the  forum for his distinction between  the abstract 
and  the concrete  universal. In Book III, Hegel writes the following: 
 
The universal  is thus the totality of the Notion; it is concrete,  and far from being empty, it 
has through  its Notion a content, and a content  in which it not only maintains itself but one 
which is its own and immanent in it. We can, indeed,  abstract from the content:  but in that 
case we do not obtain a universal  of the Notion but only the abstract universal, which is an 
isolated, imperfect  moment  of the Notion and  has no truth.  (SL: 603–4) 
 
The  concrete   universal   is  understood  to  involve   a  dialectical   relationship 
between  universality, individuality and particularity. Crucially, this is what 
distinguishes the concrete  universal  from the abstract universal; the abstract 
universal  is not dialectically  structured, hence why Hegel regards it as “isolated” 
and  “imperfect”.  Its  isolation   and  imperfection  consist  in  how  the  abstract 
universal  is the result of a poor way of relating the categories of universality, 
particularity, and individuality. Abstract universality is opposed  to the particular 
and the individual. Concrete universality is not opposed  to the particular and the 
individual. Furthermore, the  concrete  universal  is the communion of universal- 
ity, particularity and individuality. And, as such, is the proper conceptualisation 
of the relationship between  these  three  categories.  The significance  of this can 
be found by discussing Hegel’s analyses of certain  judgements, which can shed 
light on what  exactly a concrete  universal  is for Hegel. 
(A) ‘This rose is red’36:  The property  ‘red’ is here understood as something  that 
belongs  to the rose. The rose, of course,  is not only red. For, the rose has a 
scent,  form, texture,  all of which are not contained  in the property  of being 
red. The rose being red does not entail  that  the only property  of the rose is 
its being  red,  nor does  it entail  that  the rose must  have  a particular scent, 
form,  and   texture   based   on  its  being  red.  Furthermore,  ‘is  red’  is  not 
exclusively  a  property  that  one  rose  or  all  roses  have.  The  universal   is 
only  accidentally related  to the  object.  Therefore,  with  these kinds  of uni- 
versals,  “there is a clear distinction we can draw between  the universal  and 
the individual that  possess  that  property,  and  that  universal  and  the other 
 
 
 
36 Cf. EL: § 172, 250. 
  
 
 
properties it possesses, so there  is no dialectical  unity  here  between  these 
elements”.37 
(B) ‘All men are mortal’: Judgements of this form, according to Hegel, are a species of 
‘judgements of reflection’, namely quantitative judgements. The property ‘being 
a man’ is an essential property  of all individual members  of the set of human 
beings. ‘Being a man’ is not an accidental property of all individual members of 
the set of human  beings.  ‘Having hands’, for example,  is a property  which all 
human  beings may possess, but that quality is not an essential property. ‘Being 
mortal’ is an essential property  of all human  beings  – though, of course,  not 
every mortal being is human. For Hegel, those quantitative judgements which 
are also necessary judgements – such as ‘All men are mortal’ – constitute the last 
form of the judgement of reflection,  and  as such,  transition to the next major 
judgement form, the ‘judgement of necessity’. In this instance now, the universal 
judgement ‘All men are mortal’ becomes  equivalent to the judgement ‘Man as 
such is mortal’.  This kind of judgement is conceived  of as a ‘categorical judge- 
ment’, the first type of judgement of necessity.38 
(C) ‘Caius is a man’: ‘Being human’ is an essential property of Caius. “The single 
human  is what he is in particular, only insofar as he is, first of all, human  as 
such, and within the universal; and this universal  is not just something  over 
and  above the other abstract qualities  or mere determinations of reflection, 
but is rather  what  permeates and  includes  within  itself everything  particu- 
lar”. (EL: § 175, 253) Caius can only be a particular individual man if he is a 
man. And Caius cannot  be an indeterminate man, he must be a determinate 
instantiation of man, “whose differences from other men nonetheless do not 
prevent  him exemplifying  the same universal  ‘man’”.39 
 
All three  judgements  are  used  by  Hegel  to  express   a  specific  stage  of  the 
relationship between the categories of universality, particularity, and individual- 
ity. However, (C) is the kind of judgement that arrives at the dialectical  relation- 
ship  between  these  three  categories.  The universal  is now concrete,  principally 
because  it is what  an  individual is, in that  an  individual is an instantiation of 
that  kind  of universal: Caius is an  instantiation of man.  By exemplifying  the 
property  of being  a man,  even  though  Caius is distinct  from other  individual 
exemplifications of man, Caius is the individual that he is, while his being a man 
 
 
 
 
 
37 Stern (2007: 128). 
38 Cf. SL: 649–50. 
39 Stern (2007: 129). 
  
 
 
 
is also required  for and compatible with the particular determinations that make 
him the specific man  he is. 
This account  of Hegel’s position  shows  that  he can claim that  it is impos- 
sible to find a satisfactory  paraphrase of propositions involving property- 
ascriptions in which  reference  to universals is eliminated: for, the nominalist 
idea  that  one  can  establish the  truth-conditions of the  proposition ‘x is f’ by 
claiming  that  ‘is f’ applies  to x40  seems  rather  implausible. Indeed,  it could 
even  be suggested that  the notion  of ‘applying  a term/predicate to a subject’ 
involves  a commitment  to some kind  of universal, namely  a relation  – and  if 
that  is the case,  then  it seems  nominalism may well collapse  into realism.  As 
David Armstrong writes: “The Realist may well argue, correctly I believe, that a 
convincing   account   of  the  semantics  of  ‘applies’   cannot   be  given  without 
appeal  to the  properties  and/or relations  of the  object  [x]”.41  In other  words, 
arguments in  favour  of predicate nominalism, whilst  they  have  no  commit- 
ments  to monadic  universals, the  idea  of ‘applying a predicate to a subject’ 
appears to have  a commitment to a polyadic  universal, namely  some kind  of 
relation.  In resisting  a non-nominalist semantic  theory,  nominalists appear  to 
follow the conduct  of an ostrich thrusting its head into the sand,  whereby their 
philosophical commitments condemn  their cognitive practices  and intellectual 
endeavours to an impoverished state: not only does nominalism appear  to 
misrepresent the world, its failure to appreciate the philosophical problem also 
seems to have harmful  consequences for our intellectual hopes  and our aim of 
realising  our rational  capacities. 
Such  a critique  of dismissive  attitudes to metaphysics is made  in another 
passage from the Science of Logic: 
 
The fact is that  there  no  longer  exists  any  interest  either  in the  form or the  content  of 
metaphysics or in both together.  If it is remarkable when a nation  has become indifferent 
to its constitutional theory, to its national sentiments, its ethical  customs  and virtues,  it is 
certainly  no less remarkable when  a nation  loses  its metaphysics, when  the spirit  which 
contemplates its own pure  essence  is no longer  a present  reality in the life of the nation. 
The esoteric teaching  of the Kantian philosophy – that  the understanding ought  not to go 
beyond  experience, else the  cognitive  faculty  will become  a theoretical reason  which  by 
itself generates nothing  but fancies  of the brain  – this was a justification  from a philoso- 
phical  quarter  for  the  renunciation of speculative thought.  In  support of this  popular 
teaching   came  the  cry  of modern  educationists that  the  needs  of the  time  demanded 
attention to immediate  requirements, that  just  as  experience  was  the  primary  factor  for 
knowledge, so for skill in public  and  private  life, practice  and  practical  training  generally 
were  essential and  alone  necessary, theoretical insight  being  harmful  even.  Philosophy 
 
 
40  Cf. Devitt (1997: 96). 
41 Armstrong (1997: 108). 
  
 
 
and ordinary common sense thus co-operating to bring about  the downfall of metaphysics, 
there  was seen  the strange  spectacle  of a cultured  nation  without  a metaphysics – like a 
temple  richly ornamented in other respects  but without  a holy of holies.42  (SL: 25–6) 
 
Here,  Hegel  appears to  blame  Kant’s  doctrine  of Humility  for (inadvertently) 
giving rise to the growing positivist  and  nominalist philosophic culture  in early 
nineteenth century German states.  The ultimate  worry that Hegel has concerning 
Kant’s doctrine  of Humility, expressed by Hegel’s opposition to the limitation  on 
human  knowledge, is that  the  subjectivism  and  relativism  of formal  idealism 
prevents   us  from  developing  our  rational   faculties,  faculties   which  Hegel  is 
seriously   committed   to  as  the   key  to  being   in  touch   with  the   rationality 
embedded in  the  structure of reality  itself.  Why Hegel is so concerned about 
developing a system which is unrestrictive and focused  entirely on the develop- 
ment   of  rationality   is  not  because   he  believes   human   knowledge   can   be 
extended to transcendent things-in-themselves, but  because  he thinks  that  the 
basic  idea of restriction, the idea  of setting  limits,  serves as a check on human 
intellectual  endeavour  and  creativity,  things  which  he  regards  as  essential  for 
human  flourishing. Let us call this argument ‘The Perfectionist  Argument’. In 
this  respect,  not  only  is  metaphysics possible  but  it  is  also  indispensable   to 
human  flourishing. We can see why Hegel has perfectionist  attitudes towards 
metaphysical enquiry  when  we  recall  the  following  from  a  passage we  pre- 
viously discussed: 
 
Only the animals  are true blue physicists  …, since they do not think:  whereas  humans, in 
contrast, are thinking  beings,  and  born metaphysicians. 
 
For Hegel, arguably  the most important feature  of human nature  is our nature 
as a thinking being – or, to be more specific, a thinking  being  with a capacity 
for discursivity and self-consciousness. Our capacity for discursive thought is 
important,  not  only  in  the  sense  of  establishing  a  taxonomical  difference 
between rational  animals  and non-rational animals, but also in the sense of 
establishing what  is normatively significant/naturally good  for us,  given  our 
nature  as discursive  thinkers.  To quote  Philippa  Foot and  Terry Irwin on this 
issue: 
 
‘[N]atural goodness’, as I define  it, which is attributable only to living things  themselves 
and to their parts,  characteristics, and operations, is intrinsic  or ‘autonomous’ goodness  in 
that  it depends directly on the relation  of an individual to the ‘life form’ of its species.43 
 
 
 
42 See CP: 5.61; and  W2: 485–6. 
43 Foot (2001: 26–27). 
  
 
 
 
(1) Human  nature  consists  in rational  agency,  that  is, in exercising  the capacity  to guide 
behaviour by practical  reason.  (2) The human  good consists  in the full actualisation of this 
capacity  in fulfilling our other capacities. (3) The virtues are the different ways of actualis- 
ing this capacity.44 
 
According  to this  model  then,  anything which  prevents  us  from realising  our 
nature  by not allowing  us to develop  our capacities for discursive  and reflective 
thought must not be pursued as an effort to achieve  self-realisation. This forms 
the normative  explanation for why Hegel is so resistant  to eliminativist  attitudes 
to metaphysics, because  with regard to eliminativism, we are prevented from 
developing our rational  faculties. 
However, for all of Hegel’s impassioned critique of orthodox  Kantianism and 
varieties  of eliminativism about  metaphysics, neither  the orthodox  Kantian  nor 
an  eliminativist   about   metaphysics think  of  themselves  as  placing  limits  on 
thought that  tend  to  limit  our  ability  to  flourish  as  rational   beings.  For  the 
orthodox  Kantian, moving from the science of being-qua-being to transcendental 
idealism  is a crucial  step  along  the  path  to human  flourishing, because  trans- 
cendental idealism  aims  to  properly  direct  our  rational  faculties  and  thereby 
provide  the conditions whereby  enquirers  can achieve  rational  satisfaction and 
self-realisation. Rather than place undue  limits on thought, one is merely calling 
attention to and respecting  our discursive  capacities and the ways in which they 
are  restricted  by  the  conditions of sensibility  and  our  cognitive  constitution. 
Equally, for the eliminativist  about metaphysics, the elimination of metaphysical 
speculation is deemed  as a requirement for the  achievement of human  perfec- 
tion. So, what we are left with now appears to be a philosophic stalemate, with 
the additional worry that  both  the Hegelian  and  the orthodox  Kantian/elimina- 
tivist  beg  the  question against  one  another: for Hegel,  there  is need  to make 
recourse  to speculative metaphysics, in order  to flourish,  because  Kantianism 
and eliminativism are obstacles  to human  self-realisation. For the orthodox 
Kantian/eliminativist, there  is no need at all to recourse  to such  commitments, 
in  order   to  flourish,   because   Hegelianism   is  the  obstacle   to  human   self- 
realisation. 
One  way  in  which  this  stalemate  could  perhaps be  broken,   in  Hegel’s 
favour,  is  by  looking  at  Peirce’s  Rule  of Reason:  “Do  not  block  the  way  of 
inquiry” (EP: 2.48). For Peirce, the reason  why nominalism and its philosophical 
correlates, namely  eliminativism, pose  such  a threat,  to use  Forster’s  term,  is 
that  nominalism and  its philosophical correlates, due  to their  criteria  of expla- 
nation, restrict  “the kinds  of questions that  can  be investigated and  limit the 
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kinds  of  answers   to  questions that  can  be  offered  and  in  doing  so  inhibit 
the  progress  of  inquiry”.45   And  the  problem  with  restricting  enquiry  is  that 
such  a  move  is “anti-scientific  in  essence”  (CP: 2.166). And  the  fundamental 
worry about  nominalism and  its philosophical correlates  being essentially  anti- 
scientific is not simply that they conflict with the metaphysical commitments 
embedded in the  theories  of natural science,  but  that  they also go against  the 
very idea of critical enquiry simpliciter. As Peirce writes, “[i]t is one of the 
peculiarities of nominalism that  it is continually supposing things  to be abso- 
lutely  inexplicable”  (CP: 1.170). For Hegel and  Peirce,  what  constitutes  some- 
thing being scientific is not simply that what one proposes  has been put forward 
by doing natural science.  Rather,  what  makes  something  scientific  is establish- 
ing conclusions about  the structure of reality  and  the like on the basis  of self- 
critical and broad enquiry, where such practices are not just beneficial for our 
theoretical-intellectual concerns  but also for our development as human  beings. 
As Christopher  Hookway writes, “Peirce’s work in ethics is motivated  by a desire 
to explain  the possibility  of adopting the life of science as he understands it”.46 
This  is  elaborated by  Forster,  who  claims  that  “[o]n  [Peirce’s]  view,  human 
beings  are  not  cogs in a vast  cosmic  mechanism, but  rather  are  free, creative 
agents   capable   of  transforming  the  world  through   the  active  realisation  of 
intelligent  ideals”.47 
What is at stake when one puts forward philosophical theories  or even when 
one does philosophy is not merely whether  or not one attains  sufficiently  good 
levels  of representational accuracy.  Peirce is not  particularly interested in this 
purely  theoretical  mode  of cognitive  activity. Rather,  what  matters  for Peirce is 
“an ultimate, impartial, binding and rational  framework for the organisation and 
fulfilment  of human  potential”.48 The explanation for why Peirce was so expli- 
citly  opposed  to  nominalism and  its  philosophical correlates  is that  they  are 
obstacles   to  the  organisation and  fulfilment  of human   potential: nominalism 
seeks  to restrict  enquiry,  due  to being  dogmatic  and  prejudicial  in some ways, 
and by doing so, nominalism fails to promote genuinely  critical thought, thereby 
preventing  us from actualising our rational  capacities. And because  our rational 
capacities fail to be fully realised by nominalism, the possibility  of us flourishing 
does not obtain. 
In response, the  Kantian  may well concede  that  we would  in fact be more 
realised    as   rational    beings   under    the   rubric   of   Hegelian   and   Peircean 
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metaphysics. That being said, though, there is still no guarantee whatsoever that 
Hegelian and/or Peircean  metaphysics are successful: centuries  of failure in 
metaphysics would  suggest  that  success  in first philosophy is far from assured. 
Given this meta-inductive scepticism,  it would appear  we should  regretfully face 
up to the fact that metaphysics is something  we should  abandon even though  to 
do  better  on  this  score  would  enable  us  to become  more  realised  as  rational 
beings. So, rather  than  block enquiry for the sake of it due to dogmatic  attitudes 
to metaphysics, our sensitivity  to the history of metaphysics would suggest  that 
continuing down  this  particular path  of enquiry  is really  not  going  to lead  us 
anywhere  at all. 
Neither  Hegel  nor  Peirce  would  claim  that  the  task  facing  them  is  not 
difficult. However, I think  both  philosophers would  have  two objections  to the 
Kantian  here.  Firstly, since Hegel and  Peirce are fallibilists,49  the talk of ‘guar- 
antees’ would not resonate  with them at all, given how the notion of a guarantee 
appears to be infallibilist;  secondly,  even though  there has been plenty of failure 
in metaphysics throughout the  centuries, why should  we take  such  failure  to 
automatically guarantee any  future  metaphysics is doomed  to failure  as well? 
That metaphysics seems to keep returning and is experiencing a powerful 
resurgence in contemporary analytic  philosophy may in fact signal just how 
important and exciting the discipline  is as a profound  source of value for human 
beings:  the respective  metaphysical positions  of Hegel and Peirce as well as the 
contemporary work of Lowe and  Moore are all excellent  instantiations of why 
metaphysics is important for human  development, because  they  each  seem  to 
reveal  what  is crucial to critical  enquiry  – namely  “radically  new  concepts  by 
which  to live”.50  Philosophy is much  like the  phenomenological subject  in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit: it is fallible and  multi-dimensional and  moves through 
various novel stages and positions  in an attempt  to achieve rational  satisfaction; 
and  metaphysics occupies   a  central  role  in  the  attempt   to  achieve  rational 
satisfaction and a fortiori human  self-realisation, because  metaphysical concepts 
such as freedom and agency are paradigmatically thick ethical concepts. As such, 
the  Hegelian-Peircean effort to make  sense  of things  is not  just an  exercise  in 
representing states  of affairs,  it is also  an  exercise  in finding  ways for human 
beings to realise themselves through  the practice  of understanding the nature  of 
reality and  our place in it. 
However, even if one agrees  that the Hegelian-Peircean conception of meta- 
physics  provides  the  right  account  of human   flourishing  and  self-realisation, 
would  it be a requirement for us to flourish  to believe that  account?  I think  the 
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answer  to that  question, for both  Hegel and  Peirce,  would  be an  unequivocal 
‘yes’:  central  to  both  Hegelian  and  Peircean   varieties  of  metaphysics is  the 
connection between   the  right  kind  of  reasoning and  appropriate habits   for 
action. According to both Hegel and Peirce, thought is not a “theoretical detach- 
ment”.51  To be a thinking  subject  is not to be a disembodied res cogitans that  is 
separate from the world and is little more than  a cognitive voyeur. Rather, to be 
a thinking  subject is to be an embodied  being embedded in the world. Given our 
nature  as rational  and practical  embodied  thinkers  embedded in the world, how 
we understand our rational  activity is going to principally depend  on what kinds 
of habits  we develop  for engaging  with the world and other rational  agents.  For 
both  Hegel and  Peirce, at least as far as I understand them,  the kinds of habits 
we ought  to develop  for best engaging  with the world and with one another  are 
habits  which aim to “expand the frontiers  of inquiry”,52  by advocating a wholly 
inclusive   framework  for  realising   our  rational   and  social  potential: what  is 
essential  for  human   flourishing   and   self-realisation  is  cultivating   practices 
which best enable  enquirers  to fully actualise their capacity  for critical thought, 
enabling ideas  to undergo  “further assessment, challenge, defence,  and  correc- 
tion”.53  The practices  which  are most  conducive  to actualising critical  thought 
are those practices  which aim to make sense of things  in the most unprejudiced 
way, and  a necessary  feature  of having  unprejudiced attitudes to making  sense 
of things  is “a distinctive  kind of self-consciousness”,54  namely  being aware  of 
the right way of going about  understanding reality and  how to flourish. 
We would appear, by not blocking the way of enquiry,  to have avoided 
adopting one-sided  forms  of thought, rigidly  fixed  by the  understanding. In 
doing  so,  Hegel’s  and  Peirce’s  respective   positions   form  the  basis  of  our 
theoretical as well as our practical  work: they show that  not only is metaphy- 
sics unavoidable in ordinary  language and  natural scientific  enquiry  but that 
metaphysics is,  to use  an  expression  from  Bernard  Williams,  “a humanistic 
discipline”,55    and   therefore   also  required   for  our  development  as  human 
beings.  Such  is  the  powerful  nature   of this  metametaphysical position  that 
we have found a particularly compelling  and rich positive connection between 
two  philosophical  traditions  that   have  traditionally  been   conceived   of  as 
intellectual antitheses.  Moreover,  there  seems  to  be  very  strong  reason   to 
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suppose that  Hegel  and  Peirce  should   be  included in  contemporary  main- 
stream  analytic  metametaphysical  discussions concerning eliminativism and 
other  related  positions. 
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